Rental approach to distribution of rights to use fish resources
https://doi.org/10.46845/2073-3364-2023-0-1-38-52
Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to develop a model for the optimal distribution of public resources in fisheries, based on the provisions of the theory of natural rent. We describe the main theoretical aspects of the rental approach to the distribution of fish resources, discuss the features of its practical implementation, and provide a model for making a decision on distribution based on the principles and tools of the rental approach. Although the methodology described is focused on fisheries issues, it is applicable to many other cases where natural resources are publicly owned and exploited under conditions of individualistic competition.
About the Author
Aleksandr G. KharinRussian Federation
Kaliningrad.
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Review
For citations:
Kharin A.G. Rental approach to distribution of rights to use fish resources. Baltic Economic Journal. 2023;(1(41)):38-52. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.46845/2073-3364-2023-0-1-38-52